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Abstract
The causes of overfishing are reviewed along
with deficiencies in top-down input-regulated
fisheries management. An alternative is the
three pillars of fisheries policy intended to
ensure sustainable, economically viable fish-
eries and marine ecosystems. The first pillar
are incentives that promote a long-term inter-
est in both fisheries and marine ecosystems;
the second are targets that account for the
bioeconomics of fisheries; and the third, adap-
tive management practices, especially marine
protected areas, that promote resilience
against ecosystem disturbances. Collectively,
the three pillars offer a practical and proven
combination to ‘turn the tide’ and help over-
come the overexploitation prevalent in many of
the world’s marine capture fisheries.
Key words: overfishing, incentives, maxi-
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1. Introduction
There are many regional and historical
examples of fisheries that have been overex-
ploited and mismanaged. One of the best
known is the collapse of the Northern Cod
Fishery on the eastern coast of Canada, off
Newfoundland. In 1992, a moratorium on
fishing was declared as a result of a dramatic
collapse in the stock attributable to overhar-
vesting and simply ‘too many vessels, chasing
too few fish’ (Grafton et al. 2000). This fishery
had previously generated an annual catch of
about 200,000 tons for at least a century, but
beginning in the 1960s and in the absence of
any territorial control or limit on fishing,
catches peaked in 1968 at over 800,000 tons.
Extended jurisdiction by Canada out to 200
nautical miles in 1977 allowed for the exploit-
able biomass to recover and to more than
double between 1977 and 1984 as foreign
fleets lost access to many of the fishing
grounds. Nevertheless, Canadian jurisdiction
also had a downside because the Canadian
government subsidised the domestic fishing
industry to expand to take advantage of the
extended control of its continental shelf. This,
in turn, helped to increase harvests by more
than 50 per cent with a peak of 269,000 tons in
1988. Unfortunately, this harvest level was
unsustainable and equivalent to about 40 per
cent of the total exploitable biomass—and a1n
exploitation rate even higher than in the
late1960s when foreign fleets caught most of
total catch.
A direct consequence of this overexploita-
tion was that the northern cod stocks collapsed
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to about 1 per cent of their previous levels.
Twenty years later, stocks have still failed to
recover and remained at very low quantities
compared with their historic levels. Very slow
rates of recovery, as with the Northern Cod
Fishery, is a common feature of fisheries that
become depleted to very low biomass levels
(Hutchings & Reynolds 2004). A litany of fail-
ures that included subsidies to fishers, poor
measurement of the size of the cod stocks,
delays in reducing the allowable catch as stock
declined and technical change that increased
the fishing power of vessels due to improve-
ments in fishing technology all contributed to
the demise of what was once one of the
world’s largest fisheries.
Overfishing arises from inadequate informa-
tion, management approaches that are fragile
to unanticipated shocks or disturbances, an
inability to respond quickly and effectively to
stock declines, and inappropriate incentives
for fishers that encourage them to act in ways
that are contrary to the long-term interest of
the fishery and their industry. Overlaying these
information, response and incentives failures,
financial support in the form of research and
management expenditures and transfers to
fishers that amount to multiple of billions of
dollars per year (Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development 2006) have
exacerbated the problem of overfishing and
effort creep. A way forward is to adopt three
pillars of fisheries policy: one, generate long-
term incentives in fisheries and marine ecosys-
tems; two, specify quantitative biological and
economic targets that account for fishers and
fish; and three, undertake actions that promote
ecosystem and fisheries resilience and ‘bounce
back’ to negative shocks and disturbances.
This has special implications for fisheries in
the Pacific region, especially the western and
central Pacific tuna fishery (Kompas et al.
2010).
2. Causes of Overfishing
Fisheries share two features that contribute
to overfishing. First, the catch of one fisher
makes less available for harvest by others.
Consequently, there is an in-built incentive to
‘race to fish’ to ensure a desired harvest
before someone else catches the available fish.
This race is magnified when there are overall
harvest or effort controls, but no individual
limits or controls. Second, marine fisheries are
prosecuted at sea and this makes it difficult,
and often expensive, to monitor what is caught,
where fish are harvested, by whom and when.
The challenges of effective monitoring has
resulted in misreporting and also fish practices
that may be detrimental to both targeted and
non-targeted species—a problem made much
more difficult in the high seas and for highly
migratory fisheries (Metuzals et al. 2010).
The lack of property rights in fisheries has
allowed fishers to either freely enter a fishery
(open access), or if the number of vessels is
controlled (limited-user open access), to make
investments on their vessels and adopt new
technologies that increase the effective fishing
effort over time, even when nominal fishing
effort is regulated. As in the case of the North-
ern Cod Fishery, open access in the 1960s led
to gross overfishing, but even with regulated
access and controls of the total harvest imple-
mented in the 1980s during Canadian jurisdic-
tion, the same unsustainably higher levels of
exploitation continued (Grafton et al. 2000).
In another example of top-down controls,
the Australian Northern Prawn Fishery was
managed for decades with a series of input
controls designed to limit fishing power. All
these approaches encouraged fishers to substi-
tute to unregulated and less efficient inputs.
This, in turn, reduced the net returns to fishers,
lowered efficiency and resulted in even greater
fishing effort that the input regulations were
intended to halt (Kompas et al. 2004).
In many fisheries, the focus of manage-
ment is on achieving a given fishing morta-
lity, typically implemented through a total
allowable catch or harvest limit or via indirect
controls on fishing inputs. This is a top-down
approach that fails to respond to the incentive
of fishers to increase their fishing effort. In
many cases, regulators respond to this effort
creep by imposing further reductions in the
overall harvest or additional input restrictions.
This is the case of ‘shut the barn door after
the horse has bolted’ and may even provide a
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further boost to race to fish because there
remains an ongoing incentive for fishers to
substitute to unregulated inputs (Squires
1987), or when the overall catch is reduced,
fishers have an added incentive to catch their
desired harvest at an even quicker rate.
Fisheries management that focuses on the
inputs used by fishers, rather than on their
actions and motivations, has frequently led
to adverse outcomes. For example, perverse
incentives and inadequate and overly complex
governance are given as the principal reasons
for overfishing of bottom-dwelling fish species
in the North Atlantic (Maguire 2003), and has
resulted in fishers in Europe, North America
and Australia lobbying regulators not to reduce
the total allowable catch. This is because in
the absence of appropriate incentives, rights
and responsibilities, a reduction in the current
harvest level so as to conserve or grow the
fish stock is not offset by a corresponding
gain from a future, sustainable fishery. In-
stead, with top-down regulations, should
stocks recover, fishers would still need to out-
compete fellow fishers with little surety of
receiving actual, future benefits from conser-
vation actions undertaken today.
3. First Pillar: Incentive-based
Fisheries Management
By contrast to top-down regulations that
focus on overall fishery controls and often
run counter to fishers’ interests, bottom-up
incentive-based approaches seek to align indi-
vidual incentives with the public good. One of
the keys to aligning individual with collective
incentives is to provide fishers with harvest
shares or territorial use rights that allow them to
enjoy the long-term benefits of conservation
and incur the costs of overfishing. Better incen-
tives and practices arise because fishers, or their
communities, are allocated a fixed share of the
harvest or a territorial area that will allow them
to benefit from increases in the stock level and
the overall catch. These approaches have been
implemented in several countries and have
reduced costs of fishing, improved efficiency
(Grafton et al. 2000), helped to raise fisher
returns and, in a number of fisheries, promoted
more sustainable fishing practices (Grafton
et al. 1996). Evidence from at least a dozen
fisheries worldwide indicate that incentive-
based approaches that involve either indivi-
dual or community harvesting and/or territo-
rial rights, as well as the pricing of ecosystem
services, can promote sustainable fisheries
(Hannesson 2004; Grafton et al. 2006a).
Incentives that promote sustainability, in-
cluding reductions in the harvest of by-catch
(Gilman & Lundin 2010), can arise from
secure and transferable rights for catch shares
of the allowable catch or effort. Community
rights, if allocated to a sufficiently cohe-
sive and small enough number, can facilitate
collective action and coordination, improve
monitoring and compliance, and can also
generate conservation incentives. Secure and
durable harvesting shares or territorial rights
give fishers a long-term stake or interest in the
fishery beyond the current fishing season. This
can encourage conservation behaviour, and not
just for target species, and promotes bottom-up
decision-making and greater fisher involve-
ment in management decisions (McIlgorm &
Sykes 2010).
Stakeholder engagement does not, by itself,
guarantee better management decisions, but
there are numerous examples where fishers
have paid themselves for improved monitor-
ing, increased research and also voluntarily
changed previously harmful fishing practices
(Grafton et al. 2006a; McIlgorm & Sykes
2010). In a global study, Costello et al. (2008)
showed the sustainability benefits of getting
the incentives right for fishers. Using the
counterfactual that if individual fishers had
been given defined catch shares in 1970, only
9 per cent of fisheries would have suffered
reductions in catches that were10 per cent or
less of their historic maximum, and would not
have declined thereafter, versus the 28 per cent
that did suffer this fate.
4. Second Pillar: Dynamic Maximum
Economic Yield as a
Management Target
Fisheries managers have almost exclusively
adopted biological targets or goals such as
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maximising the sustained yield from a fishery,
commonly defined as BMSY. In some cases,
managers have had a target stock level slightly
larger than BMSY so as to provide a buffer
should stock levels be badly measured or to
allow for resilience to unexpected shocks that
may reduce fish populations. An alternative
biological and economic target is dynamic
BMEY that maximises the discounted net
surplus from harvesting and processing fish
(Grafton et al. 2011) and would apply whether
or not the fishery is owned by the state or
fishers directly.
Differences in goals and targets, in part,
explain differences in fishery outcomes
(Hilborn 2007). To be effective, a dynamic
BMEY as a target and benchmark should be
included as part of governance system that
explicitly accounts for uncertainty and unan-
ticipated shocks and considers accountability,
transparency, incentives, risk assessment and
management, and adaptability (Grafton et al.
2007) as key management performance crite-
ria. This dynamic BMEY target seeks to maxi-
mise the discounted net economic returns from
the fishery.
Setting a dynamic BMEY as a target does not
mean that economic considerations are para-
mount to conservation objectives because ref-
erence targets should also be used to ensure
fish stocks are at levels that do not compromise
sustainability. Such an approach has already
been implemented in Australian Common-
wealth fisheries where dynamic BMEY is
adopted as the management target (Kompas
et al. 2010). A dynamic BMEY target also does
not imply that fisheries with low rates of
growth, and at rates less than the prevailing
rate of interest, should be depleted. This is
because Grafton et al. (2010a) show that
dynamic BMEY can exceed BMSY even when the
growth rate exceeds the discount rate and also
demonstrate for a very long-lived fish species
(for example, orange roughy) that dynamic
BMEY exceeds BMSY at a discount rate in excess
of 15 per cent (Grafton et al. 2010b). More
generally, whenever dynamic BMEY exceeds
both BMSY and the current stock level, there is
double payoff, namely it increases the size of
the fish stock, raises the long-term profitability
of the fishery and also gives additional ‘buffer’
in the case of adverse shocks or poorly mea-
sured stock levels.
A difficulty with any stock target, including
dynamic BMEY, is to implement it with less
than adequate data in terms of both catches
and stock levels (Grafton et al. 2011). Another
challenge is technological change that reduces
cost per unit of fishing effort that reduces
the incentive to maintain higher stock levels
(Grafton et al. 2010a). This may result in
dynamic BMEY at less than BMSY (Squires &
Vestergaard 2013), although such a target must
account for sustainability goals and the need to
maintain a minimum viable population and be
applied with appropriate harvest control rules
(Punt 2010).
5. Third Pillar: Actions that
Promote Resilience
Uncertainty refers to situations where future
outcomes are not known with certainty, and, at
best, managers have only subjective probabili-
ties about possible outcomes. It is of para-
mount importance in fisheries because many
marine populations are subject to very large
temporal variations even in the absence of
fishing pressure. In the context of fisheries,
management the choice of whether to use
harvest or catch controls versus input or effort
controls is, in part, a function of the uncer-
tainty. A framework has been developed to
make this choice and when applied to the
Northern Prawn Fishery of Australia showed
that the total catch controls result in higher
total profits, lower variance of expected profits
and higher stock levels than effort controls
(Kompas et al. 2009).
A valuable approach to cope with uncer-
tainty and unexpected disturbances in fish
populations is to establish marine protected
areas (MPAs). This generates benefits in terms
of habitat protection from reduced harvesting
and can protect vulnerable classes of fish as
well as providing biodiversity and other con-
servation benefits. MPAs also provide resil-
ience to disturbances and direct benefits to
fishers where populations are subject to
random fluctuations. This is because MPAs
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can act as a buffer when a shock occurs and
allow for the transfer of fish from a higher
density environment within a reserve to a low-
density environment in the fishing zone. This
fish transfer, following a negative shock to the
fishery, can generate substantial benefit to
fishers immediately following such a shock.
Such fisher benefits and also the optimal size
of a MPA increase with the magnitude of the
negative shock (Grafton et al. 2006b). The
tradeoff, at least for commercial fishers, is that
they incur a lower harvest in the absence of
negative shock (Grafton et al. 2005). Using
data from the Northern Cod Fishery, Grafton
et al. (2009) present a counterfactual and show
that if an optimal-sized reserve had been estab-
lished, it would have prevented its collapse in
the early 1990s, increased fisher profits and
allowed for quicker recovery of the stock.
6. Conclusions
Fisheries policies have frequently failed to
prevent overfishing because of inadequate
management targets, regulations that fail to
consider fisher incentives and actions that are
not robust to unexpected shocks or distur-
bances. An alternative is policy that quantifies
bioeconomic targets, utilises incentive-based
approaches that provide fishers with long-
term incentives, rights and responsibilities in
fisheries, and management approaches that
allow fisheries to ‘bounce back’ following an
adverse shock. Collectively, the three pillars of
bioeconomic targets, incentive-based manage-
ment and actions that promote resilience can
generate a triple payoff: higher fisher profits
and greater efficiency, more resilient and larger
fishery populations, and improved marine eco-
system services.
May 2014.
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